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Abstract
Reformulating a scientific theory often leads to a significantly different way of understand-
ing the world. Nevertheless, accounts of both theoretical equivalence and scientific under-
standing have neglected this important aspect of scientific theorizing. This essay provides a
positive account of how reformulating theories changes our understanding. My account si-
multaneously addresses a serious challenge facing existing accounts of scientific understand-
ing. These accounts have failed to characterize understanding in a way that goes beyond
the epistemology of scientific explanation. By focusing on cases where we have differences
in understanding without differences in explanation, I show that understanding cannot be
reduced to explanation.
1 Introduction
Accounts of theoretical equivalence have neglected an important epistemological question
about reformulations: how does reformulating a theory change our understanding of the
world? Prima facie, improving our understanding is one of the chief intellectual benefits
of reformulations. Nevertheless, accounts of theoretical equivalence have focused almost
entirely on developing formal and interpretational criteria for when two formulations count
as equivalent (Weatherall 2019a). Although no doubt an important question, focusing on it
alone misses many other philosophically rich aspects of reformulation.
The burgeoning literature on scientific understandingwould seem to be a natural home for
characterizing how reformulations improve understanding. However, existing accounts of
scientific understanding do not provide a clear answer. These accounts tend to focus on com-
peting rather than compatible explanations, investigating how the best explanation provides
understanding. This strategy neglects how equivalent formulations of the same explanation
can provide different understandings. To address these gaps, I will show how theoretically
equivalent formulations can change our understanding of the world.
Harkening back to Hempel, Kitcher, and Salmon, the received view of understanding holds
that understanding why a phenomenon occurs simply amounts to grasping a correct expla-
nation of that phenomenon (Strevens 2013; Khalifa 2017, 16ff). Many recent accounts of
understanding have decried this picture as overly simplistic, arguing that genuine under-
standing goes well beyond grasping an explanation (Grimm 2010; Hills 2016; Newman 2017;
de Regt 2017). Nevertheless, these critics of the received view still maintain a close con-
nection between explanation and understanding, which Khalifa (2012, 2013, 2015) has ex-
ploited to systematically undermine their more expansive accounts. Defending what I’ll call
explanationism, Khalifa (2017) has argued that all philosophical accounts of understanding-
why straightforwardly reduce to the epistemology of scientific explanation. Explanationism
thereby poses a serious challenge to accounts of scientific understanding that seek to go be-
yond the traditional received view.
Here, I argue that we can refute explanationism by considering theoretically equivalent
formulations. By definition, theoretically equivalent formulations agree completely on the
way the world is, thereby describing the exact same state of affairs. Moreover, philosophers
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typically adopt an ontic conception of explanation, wherein explanations themselves corre-
spond to states of affairs or propositions, e.g. the reasons why an event occurs.¹ By agreeing
on the way the world is, equivalent formulations ipso facto provide the same explanations.
Nonetheless, they can differ radically in the understandings that they provide. Thus, concern-
ing many phenomena, theoretically equivalent formulations do not differ qua explanation,
even as they differ qua understanding. These differences in understanding—without con-
comitant explanatory differences—make a separate account of understanding necessary.
Section 2 develops Khalifa’s challenge for existing accounts of scientific understanding,
showing how they reduce to accounts of explanation. I focus in particular on how Khalifa
problematizes both skills-based accounts of understanding and a different strategy developed
by Lipton (2009) that foreshadows my own. Section 3 demonstrates that theoretically equiv-
alent formulations provide a large class of cases that meet Khalifa’s challenge. In these cases,
we have differences in understanding-why without differences in explanation. In Section 4,
I introduce and defend conceptualism as a positive account of these differences in under-
standing. Conceptualism characterizes how these differences arise from differences in the
presentation and organization of explanatory information. Although not a complete account
of understanding, conceptualism can be adjoined with existing accounts to both meet Khal-
ifa’s challenge and accommodate reformulations. Section 5 considers and rebuts an objection
to my use of theoretically equivalent formulations.
2 The challenge from explanationism
Traditional accounts of explanation defend a deflationary stance toward understanding. Ac-
cording to Khalifa, “on the old view, if understanding was not merely psychological afterglow,
it was nevertheless redundant, being replaceable by explanatory concepts without loss” (2012,
17). Explanationism encapsulates this deflationary position:
Explanationism: all philosophically significant aspects of understanding-why are
encompassed by an appropriately detailed account of the epistemology of scien-
tific explanation.²
Importantly, even non-deflationary accounts of scientific understanding must adopt some
account of scientific explanation. Then, given whatever account of explanation is adopted,
explanationism demands an argument that understanding-why does not reduce to claims
about (this kind of) explanation. For this reason, explanationism is dialectically most ef-
fective when married with explanatory pluralism (Khalifa 2017, 8).³ Then, no matter which
account(s) of explanation is ultimately correct, explanationism challenges non-deflationary
accounts of understanding on their own terms.
Khalifa defends explanationism by developing a detailed account of the epistemology of
scientific explanation, which he calls the explanation-knowledge-science (EKS) model. Ac-
cording to this framework, an agent improves their understanding why p provided that they
¹For the ontic conception, see Salmon (1998 [1984], 325), Strevens (2008, 6), Craver (2014), and Skow (2016).
²In earlier work, Khalifa refers to this position as the explanatory model of understanding (2012, 17). Khalifa
(2017, 85) uses “explanationism” in a narrower sense aimed at showing how objectual understanding can be reduced
to explanatory understanding, ultimately defendingwhat he calls “quasi-explanationism.” For convenience, I simplify
this more cumbersome terminology.
³Khalifa (2012, 19) claims that explanationism is compatible with explanatory monism, but only if the requisite
unified theory of explanation accommodates all typical cases of explanation. It is not clear that such a theory exists.
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either (i) gain amore complete grasp of p’s explanatory nexus or (ii) their grasp of this explana-
tory nexus more closely resembles scientific knowledge (Khalifa 2017, 14). Khalifa defines the
explanatory nexus as the “totality of explanatory information about p,” which includes all cor-
rect explanations of p and the relations between these explanations (2017, 6). I will return to
the explanatory nexus in Section 3, arguing that knowledge of this nexus does not exhaust
differences in understanding-why. Turning to scientific knowledge, Khalifa argues that this
requires learning a correct explanation through a process of scientific explanatory evaluation
(SEEing).⁴ Scientific explanatory evaluation involves a three-step process of 1) considering
plausible potential explanations, 2) comparing these potential explanations, and 3) deciding
how to rank these potential explanations with respect to approximate truth (or at least saving
the phenomena) (Khalifa 2017, 12-13). Khalifa uses this ordinary process of SEEing to deflate
many anti-explanationist accounts of understanding.
To date, the main anti-explanationist strategy has been to argue that understanding-why
involves special skills or abilities. Provided that these skills go beyond what’s required for
explaining or possessing knowledge-why, explanationism would be refuted.⁵ Versions of
this skills-based strategy include skills for grasping counterfactual information (Grimm 2010,
2014), “cognitive control” over providing and manipulating explanations (Hills 2016), and in-
ferential skills used in making certain kinds of models (Newman 2013, 2017). de Regt has
provided one of the most sustained defenses of the skills-based strategy, arguing that under-
standing involves the ability to make qualitative predictions using an intelligible theory that
explains the phenomenon (de Regt and Dieks 2005; de Regt 2009a, 2017).
Khalifa’s criticism of Grimm provides the most succinct illustration of explanationism in
action. Khalifa argues that Grimm’s (2010) account of understanding makes no advance over
Woodward’s (2003) account of explanation. According to Grimm, understanding is an ability
to predict how changing one variable changes another variable, ceteris paribus (2010, 340-
41). Yet, as Khalifa notes—and Grimm acknowledges (2010, 341; 2014, 339)—this kind of un-
derstanding is closely related to Woodward’s analysis of “what-if-things-had-been-different
questions.” Hence, this kind of counterfactual reasoning ability is clearly part of scientific
explanatory evaluation (SEEing). We already deploy counterfactual reasoning in considering
and comparing alternative explanations, and explaining already involves the ability to answer
these what-if questions (Khalifa 2017, 71, 74). Khalifa’s response is easily generalized: if all
that a theory of understanding adds is referencing a cognitive ability to use an explanation,
then a theory of explanation can make the same move without modification.⁶
Another obvious anti-explanationist strategy would involve identifying cases of scientific
understanding in the absence of an explanation. Such cases would, at first glance, show that
accounts of explanation miss something about understanding. Undertaking precisely this
strategy, Lipton (2009) considers a number of cases where we seemingly acquire the cognitive
benefits of explanations without actually providing explanations. These cognitive benefits
include knowledge of causes, necessity, possibility, and unification (2009, 44). Against the
received view, Lipton identifies understanding not as “having an explanation,” but rather
with “the cognitive benefits that an explanation provides” (2009, 43). Notice that this still
⁴Khalifa also requires that this belief-forming process be safe, i.e. sufficiently unlikely to lead to false beliefs.
⁵Some epistemologists have pursued other strategies, arguing that objectual understanding either does not re-
duce to understanding-why or else that some forms of objectual understanding do not even require explanatory
understanding. Khalifa responds at length to these approaches (2017, 80ff).
⁶Khalifa (2012) applies this strategy to criticize de Regt and Dieks (2005) and de Regt (2009a, 2009b) in detail.
Against Hills, Khalifa argues that her necessary conditions for understanding are either irrelevant for enhancing
understanding or else they are captured by the EKS model (2017, 70-72). He responds to Newman in his (2015).
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maintains a close connection between understanding and explanation.
Khalifa (2013) exploits this connection to argue that Lipton’s strategy makes no funda-
mental advance over the explanation literature. Systematically examining each of Lipton’s
examples, Khalifa shows that whenever there is understanding through a non-explanation,
there is an explanation that provides that understanding and more. This leads to what Khalifa
calls “explanatory idealism” about understanding, which holds that “other modes of under-
standing ought to be assessed by how well they replicate the understanding provided by
knowledge of a good and correct explanation” (2013, 162). Thus, a suitably detailed account
of scientific explanation would provide the same insights about understanding that Lipton
defends. In this way, explanation functions as the “ideal of understanding” (Khalifa 2013,
162). More recently, Khalifa (2017) has recast part of his criticism as what he calls the “right
track objection.” According to this objection, Lipton’s examples involve agents who merely
have a kind of “proto-understanding,” wherein they are on the right track to acquiring an
explanation and thereby understanding-why.
In the remainder of this essay, I defend a strategy that avoids Khalifa’s objections against
existing accounts of scientific understanding. My strategy succeeds where others fail for two
reasons. First, I do not rely on positing any special abilities unique to understanding, so
Khalifa’s challenge from SEEing does not apply. Secondly, the examples I consider provide
understanding through the same explanatory information, so explanatory idealism does not
apply either.
3 Intellectual differenceswithout explanatory differences
To refute explanationism, it suffices to identify differences in understanding-why between
two presentations of the same explanation, since these appeal—ipso facto—to the same ex-
planatory information. In such cases, understanding-why still arises from an explanation,
but non-explanatory differences account for the corresponding differences in understanding.
The features we ascribe to “understanding-why” and to “explanation” then truly come apart.
For convenience, I will refer to differences in understanding as intellectual differences. This
section aims to show that, pace explanationism, we can have intellectual differences without
concomitant explanatory differences.
To forestall any hopes of a piecemeal explanationist rebuttal, my argument requires a
sufficiently large class of examples stemming from scientific practice. As we will see, the re-
cent literature on theoretical equivalence provides a rich set of cases, spanning many parts of
physics. Nevertheless, somemight worry that these mathematical reformulations are too iso-
lated or special to be indicative of scientific understanding in general. Hence, it is worthwhile
to also consider a more common aspect of scientific practice: diagrammatic reformulations. I
will consider both cases in turn, illustrating each with a paradigmatic example.⁷ Importantly,
my argument does not apply to cases of different but complementary explanations, such as
Salmon’s example of causal-mechanical vs. unificationist explanations of a balloon moving
forward upon takeoff in an airplane (Salmon 1998, 73; de Regt 2017, 77). Such complementary
explanations appeal to different explanatory information and are hence genuinely different
explanations. Khalifa’s EKS model of understanding accommodates such cases since they
reference different parts of the explanatory nexus (2017, 25).
By definition, theoretically equivalent formulations express the same scientific theory,
⁷Reformulations of symmetry arguments provide another class of examples. See Hunt (forthcoming) for details.
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agreeing exactly on the way the world is (or could be). Philosophers have defended a few dif-
ferent characterizations of theoretical equivalence, including definitional equivalence (Gly-
mour 1971), model isomorphism (North 2009), and categorical equivalence (Halvorson 2016;
Weatherall 2016; Barrett 2019). These accounts all seek to formalize the intuition that two
formulations are theoretically equivalent if and only if they are mutually inter-translatable
and empirically equivalent. Mutual inter-translatability requires that any thing expressed in
one formulation can be expressed in the other without loss of physically significant informa-
tion. Empirical equivalence requires that the formulations agree on all physically possible
measurable consequences.
Recent defenses of categorical equivalence have shown it to be the most fruitful crite-
rion for theoretical equivalence. It successfully formalizes a number of philosophically and
scientifically plausible cases of theoretically equivalent formulations.⁸ Five prominent exam-
ples include Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations of classical mechanics (Barrett 2019),
standard and geometrized formulations of Newtonian gravity theories (Weatherall 2016),
Lorentzian manifold and Einstein algebra formulations of general relativity (Rosenstock et
al. 2015), Faraday tensor and 4-vector potential formulations of classical electromagnetism
(Weatherall 2016), and principal bundle and holonomy formulations of Yang–Mills gauge the-
ories (Rosenstock and Weatherall 2016). Here, then, is a varied class of cases that collectively
pose a substantive problem for explanationism.
In each of these cases, I contend, we have intellectual differences without corresponding
explanatory differences. Each formulation provides a different understanding than its equiv-
alent counterpart for at least the following simple reason: understanding one does not entail
understanding the other (and indeed, showing that they are equivalent requires nontrivial in-
sights). For instance, understanding a phenomenon via Lagrangian mechanics does not entail
an understanding of that same phenomenon using Hamiltonianmechanics. Thus, Lagrangian
understanding-why differs from Hamiltonian understanding-why, even though both involve
grasping the same explanation. The lack of explanatory differences follows from categorical
equivalence, which entails that we can inter-translate models of one formulation into mod-
els of the other without losing any information.⁹ In other words, equivalent formulations
possess “the same capacities to represent physical situations” (Rosenstock et al. 2015, 315).
On the common ontic conception of explanation assumed here, explanatory information it-
self is a subset of this physical information, so equivalent formulations a fortiori represent
the same explanatory information. Thus, whenever one formulation provides an explana-
tion, any equivalent formulation provides the same explanation, preserving everything of
explanatory significance—but not necessarily of intellectual significance.
Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics provide a simple but detailed illustration of the
foregoing points.¹⁰ These equivalent formulations display two main sources of intellectual
differences. First, they differ in how they encode the system’s dynamics. The Lagrangian
formalism uses a Lagrangian function L(qi; q˙i; t), encoding the dynamics as a function of time
t , generalized coordinates qi, and generalized velocities q˙i.¹¹ In the Hamiltonian formalism,
we perform a variable change from generalized velocities to generalizedmomenta pi, yielding
the HamiltonianH(qi; pi; t). Despite encoding the same physical information, the Lagrangian
⁸For an introduction see Halvorson (2016, 601) and for technical details Weatherall (2016, 2019b).
⁹For defenses of this claim, see Weatherall (2016, 1083, 1087) and Rosenstock et al. (2015, 314).
¹⁰Technically—within a subclass of models known as the hyper-regular domain—Barrett (2019) shows that the
Lagrangian tangent bundle and Hamiltonian cotangent bundle formulations are equivalent. For ease of exposition,
I present their more elementary coordinate-based formalisms. For details see Goldstein et al. (2002).
¹¹Here, the index i runs over {1, 2, …, n}. The “v˙” notation indicates a first derivative with respect to time.
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and Hamiltonian organize this information differently, as illustrated below. Secondly, the
two formulations represent the dynamical laws of evolution (the equations of motion) in
dramatically different ways. Whereas the Lagrangian formulation represents these as a set
of n-many 2nd-order differential equations (the Euler–Lagrange equations), the Hamiltonian
formulation represents these same equations of motion as a set of 2n-many 1st-order differ-
ential equations (Hamilton’s equations).¹² By reorganizing the equations of motion in this
way, the Hamiltonian formulation treats the generalized coordinates qi and the generalized
momenta pi more symmetrically. This leads to further intellectual differences in some cases,
such as the symmetry argument considered next.
A typical explanandum in mechanics concerns the evolution of a classical system such
as a pendulum or spinning top. In systems with symmetry, one generalized coordinate—e.g.
qn—is typically ignorable, meaning that it does not occur in the Lagrangian or Hamiltonian.¹³
The equations of motion then entail that the corresponding conjugate momentum, pn, is a
conserved quantity, i.e. a constant a . It is here that a dramatic intellectual difference oc-
curs between the formulations. Despite pn being constant, the corresponding generalized
velocity q˙n need not be. Hence, q˙n still appears in the Lagrangian as a nontrivial variable.
A Lagrangian understanding of the system’s evolution thereby still requires considering n-
many degrees of freedom, despite having an ignorable coordinate. In contrast, the Hamilto-
nian formalism enables a genuine reduction in the number of degrees of freedom that need
to be considered, resulting in a different understanding. Thanks to changing variables from
generalized velocities to generalized momenta, the Hamiltonian depends on the latter but
not the former. Hence, we can replace pn in the Hamiltonian with a constant a , and—with
the ignorable coordinate qn also absent—this eliminates an entire degree of freedom from
consideration.¹⁴ As Butterfield remarks, this example “illustrates one of mechanics’ grand
themes: exploiting a symmetry so as to reduce the number of variables needed to treat a
problem” (2006, 43). Although not an explanatory difference, this variable reduction demon-
strates a difference in how the same explanatory content is organized. This organizational
difference results in a different understanding of the system’s evolution. Indeed, these kinds
of organizational differences ultimately lead to differences in understanding Noether’s first
theorem—a foundational result connecting continuous symmetries and conserved quantities
(Butterfield 2006).
Thanks to their rigorous mutual inter-translatability, categorically equivalent formula-
tions provide the most precise illustration of my argument. However, at a less rigorous level,
theoretically equivalent formulations arise whenever we reformulate a theory while keeping
its physical content the same. This motivates including at least some instances of diagram-
matic reasoningwithin the class of theoretically equivalent formulations. Although neglected
by the literature on theoretical equivalence, diagrammatic reformulations satisfy the same in-
tuitive criteria: mutual inter-translatability and empirical equivalence. They thereby provide
another large class of examples where we can have differences in understanding-why with-
out concomitant explanatory differences. Examples of diagrammatic reformulations include
Feynman diagrams in particle and condensed matter physics, graphical approaches to the
quantum theory of angular momentum (Brink and Satchler 1968), Penrose–Carter diagrams
in space-time theories, graph-theoretic approaches to chemistry (Balaban 1985; Trinajstić
¹²In both cases, we require 2n initial values to solve these equations.
¹³It is easy to show that a generalized coordinate does not appear in the Lagrangian if and only if it does not
appear in the Hamiltonian.
¹⁴Technically, we replace one of Hamilton’s equations with a trivial integral for calculating q˙n.
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1992), and diagrams for mechanistic reasoning in biology (Abrahamsen and Bechtel 2015).
To illustrate how diagrammatic reasoning can provide intellectual differences, consider
Feynman diagrams in particle physics. Here, the explanandum is typically a scattering am-
plitude for a particular interaction, explained by calculating terms in a perturbation expan-
sion. Without using Feynman diagrams, we can calculate each term up to a desired order in
perturbation theory. This provides one way of understanding the scattering amplitude. Al-
ternatively, we can reorganize this same explanatory information using Feynman diagrams,
allowing us to express connectivity properties of terms in the perturbation expansion. To
calculate the scattering amplitude, it suffices to know the connected terms; the disconnected
terms do not contribute.¹⁵ Focusing on connectivity therebymakes it unnecessary to consider
a vast number of terms in the perturbation expansion—terms that a brute force calculation
would show vanish. In this way, Feynman diagrams lead to a different understanding of
scattering amplitudes but without introducing any additional explanatory information.¹⁶
4 A conceptualist account of understanding
I have argued that a variety of mathematical and diagrammatic reformulations provide intel-
lectual differences without associated explanatory differences. Yet, if not from explanatory
differences, whence do these intellectual differences arise? To answer this question, I will
introduce and defend conceptualism, which claims that intellectual differences result from
differences in how explanatory information is organized and presented. These organizational
differences lead to differences in what we need to know to present explanations, leading to
differences in understanding-why. I will consider an objection that conceptualismmerely de-
scribes how reformulations modify explanatory concepts, with no effect on understanding-
why. To rebut this objection, I will argue that nontrivial changes in explanatory concepts
necessarily lead to differences in understanding-why.
Conceptualism posits a sufficient condition for differences in understanding-why: refor-
mulating an explanation generates an intellectual difference whenever it changes what we
need to know or what suffices to know to present that explanation. For instance, in shifting
from Lagrangian mechanics to Hamiltonian mechanics, we learn that we don’t need to know
how to represent the system and its dynamics using the Lagrangian and the Euler–Lagrange
equations. Knowledge of the Hamiltonian and Hamilton’s equations suffices. Mutatis mutan-
dis, the same can be said for shifting from Hamiltonian mechanics to Lagrangian mechanics,
leading again to a difference in understanding. Similarly, reformulating scattering amplitude
explanations using Feynman diagrams teaches us that we don’t need to know the discon-
nected terms in the perturbation expansion: knowledge of the connected terms suffices. For
convenience, I will refer to these differences in what-we-need-to-know or what-suffices-to-
know as epistemic dependence relations (EDRs). Conceptualism claims that when equivalent
formulations provide different epistemic dependence relations, they manifest intellectual dif-
ferences.
To rebuff explanationism, these intellectual differences must be genuine differences in
understanding why empirical phenomena occur. If instead these intellectual differences con-
¹⁵A term is connected if there is a path of propagators connecting every pair of source factors and/or vertex factors
in the term. For technical background and formal results, see for instance Srednicki (2007, §§8–10) and Lancaster
and Blundell (2014, §§16–20, 22, and 24).
¹⁶de Regt (2017, 251ff) also considers Feynman diagrams to defend his account of understanding. Whereas he
focuses on visualization, I focus only on formal features that are independent of human psychology.
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cern some other kind of understanding, explanationism is left unscathed. Accordingly, an
explanationist might argue that differences in EDRs do not genuinely affect understanding-
why. Rather, these differences might merely affect our understanding of the concepts used
to represent explanations, concepts such as Lagrangians, Hamiltonians, connected diagrams,
Lorentzian manifolds, etc.¹⁷ If so, conceptualism would have failed to identify a genuine
source of intellectual differences.
Conceptualism agrees with part of this objection: in the first instance, reformulating an
explanation changes our understanding of that explanation. However, nontrivial changes
in understanding an explanation entail differences in understanding-why. Conceptualism
reframes this claim as a simple bridge principle:¹⁸
Intellectual bridge principle (IBP): A nontrivial difference in understanding an ex-
planation of p leads to a different understanding why p.
According to this bridge principle, organizing the same explanatory information differently
can lead to a different understanding-why, as we have seen in the case of Lagrangian and
Hamiltonian mechanics. Different ways of understanding an explanation are nontrivial pro-
vided that they are not merely conventional differences in presenting an explanation. Hence,
the intellectual bridge principle excludes a large class of trivial notational variants from count-
ing as intellectually significant.¹⁹ For instance, uniformly replacing “5” everywhere with “V”
in an Arabic numeral system would result in different presentations of many explanations,
but these differences would be trivial, rather than intellectually significant. Similarly, re-
casting an explanation using a left-handed coordinate system rather than a right-handed one
would not result in any differences in understanding-why. Although it is difficult to precisely
delimit trivial from nontrivial notational variants, my defense of conceptualism requires only
the existence of clear cases of nontrivial reformulations, such as those developed in Section 3.
In general, conceptualism posits that a difference in epistemic dependence relations is both
necessary and sufficient for an intellectually significant difference.²⁰ Trivial notational vari-
ants do not provide different EDRs and hence do not generate intellectual differences.
In response, an explanationist might attempt to reject this bridge principle. However,
the IBP follows straightforwardly from the received view of understanding, which explana-
tionism seeks to uphold. Recall that according to the received view, understanding why a
phenomenon occurs amounts to grasping an explanation of that phenomenon. Grasping ex-
planations requires that we can represent them, and any way of representing explanations
involves concepts. Hence, understanding the relevant explanatory concepts is necessary for
understanding-why. Understanding-why is thereby derivative on the way that we have un-
derstood this explanation, such as the epistemic dependence relationswe have used to present
it. Thus, at least some changes in explanatory concepts must lead to concomitant changes in
understanding-why. In other words, any account of understanding requires a bridge principle
to connect our explanatory concepts with achieving understanding.
With these distinctions in hand, conceptualism straightforwardly identifies the origins of
intellectual differences between the equivalent formulations mentioned in Section 3. To take
¹⁷I adapt this objection from Khalifa (2017, 138), who develops it as a further argument against Lipton (2009).
¹⁸de Regt similarly argues that understanding a phenomenon necessarily requires being able to understand a
theory (2017, 44). However, I disagree with de Regt that understanding a theory is always pragmatic and contextual.
¹⁹Grammatically, “intellectually significant” is analogous to “explanatorily significant.” It characterizes differences
that matter for understanding.
²⁰Reasons of space prevent a detailed defense of this claim, which I defend elsewhere.
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one example, the Einstein algebra formalism is markedly different from the standard formu-
lation of general relativity. It teaches us that we don’t need to know the standard Lorentzian
manifold and metric concepts to provide explanations in general relativity. Instead, we can
reorganize all of the relevant explanatory information using algebraic notions, as Geroch
(1972) has argued. Since this reformulation changes what we need to know to present expla-
nations, it is not a trivial notational variant of the standard formulation. It thereby satisfies
the intellectual bridge principle, leading to a different understanding-why for phenomena
explained by general relativity.
By itself, conceptualism does not provide a full-fledged account of scientific understand-
ing. Instead, it illuminates an important facet of understanding that has been neglected in
the literature. Due to its minimal commitments, conceptualism can be adjoined with exist-
ing accounts of understanding, particularly those allied against explanationism. Although
compatible with skills-based accounts of understanding, conceptualism does not assume any
special role for skills or abilities. The key insight behind my position is that how a theory-
formulation organizes explanatory information matters for understanding. Scientific agents
perform no more special a role than grasping this organizational structure. For these reasons,
my position is not susceptible to the explanationist strategy against skills-based accounts con-
sidered in Section 2. Likewise, since conceptualism focuses on how recasting explanations
changes understanding, it does not succumb to Khalifa’s objections to Lipton’s (2009) under-
standing without explanation proposal.
5 An objection against theoretical equivalence
Prima facie, one strategy remains available to an explanationist: they can reject my argument
in Section 3 that theoretically equivalent formulations provide the same explanation. Instead,
they might argue that in such cases, one formulation takes explanatory priority. There are
at least two candidate sources of explanatory priority. First, one formulation might be phys-
ically privileged. For instance, Curiel (2014) privileges Lagrangian mechanics for allegedly
encoding the kinematic constraints of classical systems. Secondly, one formulation might be
more fundamental or joint-carving than another. This metaphysical difference would pre-
sumably entail a corresponding explanatory difference, wherein the more fundamental for-
mulation provides a better explanation (Sider 2011, 61). Differences in joint-carving or per-
fectly natural properties would then be part of the explanatory nexus. For instance, North
(2009) argues that Hamiltonian mechanics is more fundamental than Lagrangian mechanics.
However, this objection sits uneasily within the broader dialectical strategy of explana-
tionism. Recall from Section 2 that to problematize multifarious accounts of understanding,
explanationism adopts a form of explanatory pluralism. Otherwise, it is all too easy to desig-
nate some aspects of explanation (e.g. the causal-mechanical ones) as genuinely explanatory
while other aspects (such as unification) are seen as mattering for understanding but not
explanation. Furthermore, adopting explanatory pluralism seems to require a modicum of
ontological pluralism as well (Khalifa 2017, 7). This is because different models of explana-
tion take different ontological features as necessary for providing explanations, as shown in
recent debates over causal vs. noncausal explanations (Lange 2017).
Hence, insofar as explanationism requires both explanatory and ontological pluralism, it
cannot preclude the interpretation of theoretically equivalent formulations adopted in Sec-
tion 3. It must allow philosophers to interpret cases of theoretically equivalent formulations
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as being just that: genuinely equivalent both physically and metaphysically.²¹ If explanation-
ists instead adopt a single account of explanation, they will be unable to systematically recast
all purported differences in understanding as explanatory differences. The explanationist is
thus caught on the horns of a dilemma. Either they renounce explanatory pluralism and
thereby fail to systematically deflate skills-based accounts of understanding, or they main-
tain pluralism and thereby allow that theoretically equivalent formulations provide the same
explanation but different understandings.
6 Conclusion
I have argued that theoretically equivalent formulations provide a clear counterexample to
explanationism. Whereas explanationism holds that all intellectual differences arise from ex-
planatory differences, equivalent formulations show that some differences in understanding-
why do not reduce to explanatory differences. To accommodate these intellectual differences,
I have proposed conceptualism. Conceptualism argues that understanding-why involves not
only the explanatory content that we have understood, but also the way that we have under-
stood it. In particular, it claims that equivalent formulations manifest intellectual differences
whenever they provide different epistemic dependence relations. These are differences in what
we need to know or what suffices to know to provide an explanation. By characterizing how
reformulations change understanding, conceptualism addresses complementary lacunae in
current accounts of both scientific understanding and theoretical equivalence. In this way,
conceptualism supplements existing anti-explanationist accounts of scientific understanding.
By adopting conceptualism, these accounts can forestall the challenge from explanationism
and genuinely go beyond the epistemology of scientific explanation.
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